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RULES 
. . . . . .  ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
Insofar as is germane to this appeal, this lawsuit arises out of a dispute between 
Complete Property Management and Investment Realty, Inc., henceforth called "CPM in 
this document, and Tricia Callies, henceforth called "Callies" in this document, on one side 
and Charter Builders, Inc., Charter Pointe Apartments, LLC, and Silver Oaks, LLC, 
henceforth respectively called "CBI", "Charter Pointe" and "Silver Oaks" in this document, 
on the other over real estate commissions claimed by CPM and Callies to be owed by CBI, 
Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks. The crux of the dispute for purposes of this appeal is the 
sufficiency of the legal descriptions in the listing agreements executed by the parties. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
On October 3, 2006, October 24, 2006 and November 8, 2006, Tricia Callies, the 
broker for CPM, henceforth called "Callies" in this document, CPM and other plaintiffs filed 
a series of three complaints against a number of defendants, including CBI, Charter Pointe, 
Silver Oaks and George O'Neal, the president of CBI, henceforth called "O'Neal" in this 
document. R, Vol. I, pp. 20-29,65-71, and 78-1 17. These lawsuits asserted a number of 
causes of action connected with the limited liability companies, including claims for breach 
of contract, unjust enrichment and judicial dissolution. It is the third of these complaints, 
that filed on November 8, 2006, as case no. CV OC 0620977, R, Vol. I, pp. 78-1 17, that 
set forth the claims for the real estate commissions at issue in this appeal. On November 
15, 2006, CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks filed counterclaims against Callies in the 
first of the lawsuits, that filed on October 3, 2006, as case no. CV OC 0618504. R, Vol. I, 
pp. 30-55. Those counterclaims sought, among other things, a declaration that the listing 
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agreements at issue in the third lawsuit were invalid for failure to set forth a legally 
enforceable description of the property concerned by the contracts. R, Vol. I, pp. 38-42. 
Callies denied this counterclaim on November 30, 2006, referring in her answer to the 
complaint previously filed in the third case. R, Vol. I, pp. 56-63. On March 16, 2007, the 
three lawsuits were consolidated into the first action, case no. 0618504, which brought 
together, into one case, the conflicting pleadings described above. R, Vol. I, pp. 6,64 and 
77. 
On April 18, 2007, CBI and Charter Pointe filed motions for partial summary 
judgment seeking the dismissal of the claims for payment of the commissions and a judicial 
determination that the listing agreements were unenforceable for want of a valid property 
description. R, Vol. I, pp. 122-125. While undersigned counsel, who substituted into this 
action only after the appeal had been filed, does not see a comparable motion filed by 
Silver Oaks in the record, it is clear that the parties and court deemed that defendant to 
have joined in the motions as well. R, Vol. II, p. 302. 
The trial court granted the requested partial summary judgments by memorandum 
decision and order entered on August 31,2007. R, Vol. 11, pp. 302-318. On the strength 
of this decision, an amended judgment was entered on December 19, 2007, in which the 
court recited that CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oakes had recovered judgment on all 
claims regarding the commissions, including their request for declaratory relief and CPM's 
and Callies' claim for monetary damages. R, Vol. II, pp. 325-327. This amended judgment 
included a certificate executed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R, Vol. II, p. 327. CPM and Cailies filed their notice of appeal on January 28, 
2008. R, Vol. II, pp. 330-335. 
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Statement of Facts 
Consistent with the rules by which summary judgments are to be evaluated on 
appeal, Callies and CPM state the facts in the record in the light most favorable to them, 
taking advantage of any inferences that may reasonably be drawn in their favor from the 
facts appearing of record and resolving any doubts against the moving party. Matter of 
Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct.App. 1994). Those facts show the 
claims against Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks to be generally alike for purposes of this 
appeal. 
Callies and CPM entered into their listing agreement with Charter Pointe on March 
1, 2005. R, Exh. 7, paragraph 2. The property that they were to sell for Charter Pointe 
consisted of 32 four-plexes, comprising a total of 128 units. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. The 
legal description of the property on which the units were to be placed had been prepared 
before the contract was signed, but the final plat detailing the individual units was not 
recorded until April I I, 2006. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. Before that recording, on February 
28, 2006, the listing agreement had been extended. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. Moreover, 
before the execution of the extension agreement, R, Exh. 8, p. 15, O'Neal had provided 
Callies with individual legal descriptions based upon a preliminary plat showing the location 
of the individual units. R, Exh. 8 paragraph 2. At that time, this plat was inserted by the 
parties into their files pertaining to the listing agreement. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. Once 
the plat was approved but before any closings occurred on the purchase and sale of any 
individual units, O'Neal provided Callies with definitive legal descriptions for each of the 
individual units in the project. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2. This description tied the individual 
units to the final plat. R, Exh. 8, pp. 12-13. 
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Not until after the recording of the final plat did Charter Pointe and the purchasers 
located by Callies and CPM proceed to closing. Some of the closings occurred as 
scheduled, but in other instances the buyers backed out of the contracts because Charter 
Pointe failed to complete the units on time. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 9 and 13. Not until 
immediately before the closings began to occur did anyone question whether Callies or 
CPM were entitled to the commissions from Charter Pointe. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 6 and 
7. 
The facts concerning the Silver Oaks development differed from those of Charter 
Pointe in that the execution of the listing agreement was not completed until March 7, 
2005, and this project consisted of 70 four-plexes, or 280 units. R, Exh. 9, paragraph 2. 
Moreover, the legal description of the property on which the Silver Oaks units were to be 
placed was not prepared until March 14, 2005, after the listing agreement had been 
signed. R, Exh. 9, paragraph 2. However, once this occurred, the general progression of 
the Silver Oaks project was like that of Charter Pointe. O'Neal provided Callies with legal 
descriptions for the individual units based upon the preliminary plat showing the location 
of the individual units before the listing agreement was extended on February 28, 2006. 
R, Exh. 9, paragraphs 2 and 5. This platwas placed by the parties into their files pertaining 
to the listing agreement. R, Exh. 9, paragraph 2. Not until Callies raised some of the 
financial issues involved in the litigation did anyone question whether Callies and CPM 
were entitled to the commissions from Silver Oaks. R, Exh. 9, paragraphs 7 and 8. 
The differences in the facts relating to the two projects are not significant for present 
purposes. Distilled to their essence, the facts show that, when the listing agreements were 
originally signed, there was no legal description available forthe individual units that Callies 
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and CPM were to sell for either Charter Pointe or Silver Oakes. However, in both 
instances, the parties later added legal descriptions for the individual units set forth in 
preliminary plats to their contracts and included the plats in the relevant files before any 
transaction closed. In the case of Charter Pointe, O'Neal provided Callies with definitive 
legal descriptions for the individual units before any sales of the individual units closed. 
At no time in the marketing of either project was there any confusion between 
Callies on one side and Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks on the other as to what property 
was being sold. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 2 and 6 and Exh. 9, paragraphs 2 and 7. The 
contracts and the process followed by the parties in the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks 
projects were the same as those which they had successfully used in the marketing of 
seven other projects: Concord Commons, Boomer, Fenway Park Fourplexes and 
Townhomes, Pheasant Run, Lake Forest, Hampton Estates and Foxboro. R, Exh. 8, 
paragraph 2 and Exh. 9, paragraph 2. These procedures were intended to enable the 
developers, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, to pay for the development of their projects 
with the funds generated by contracts negotiated by Callies and CPM before the legal 
descriptions for the property were available. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 2 and Exh. 9, 
paragraph 2. All of the contracts that were signed and sales that occurred were brokered 
by Callies. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 9 and Exh. 9, paragraph 11. Callies devoted substantial 
time to the projects and incurred costs of $97,239.26 in marketing the properties. In 
addition, she turned down many offers to work on other projects because of her 
involvement in the projects at issue in this litigation. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 10 and 12 and 
Exh. 9, paragraphs 14 and 15. 
ISSUESPRESENTEDONAPPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to recognize the genuine issues of material fact 
that precluded it from entering summary judgment in this action? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the listing agreementswere 
unenforceable for lack of legally enforceable descriptions of the property to be sold 
pursuant to the agreements? 
3. Did the trial court err in analyzing the motions for summary judgment on the 
basis of ldaho Code Section 9-503 rather than ldaho Code Section 9-508? 
4. Did the trial court err in its analysis of the rights of CPM and Callies to recover 
damages on the theory of partial performance? 
5. Did the trial court err in its analysis of the rights of CPM and Callies to recover 
damages on the basis of quasi-estoppel? 
6. Is Callies entitled to the attorney fees incurred in the course of this appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from the grant of a summary judgment, this Court's standard of review 
is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on the original motion. 
Intermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 1 36 ldaho 233,235,31 P.3d 
921, 923 (2001). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sacred 
Heart Medical Center v. Boundary County, 338 ldaho 534, 66 P.3d 238 (2003). The 
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with 
the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 ldaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 
960, 963 (1994). The appellate court liberally construes the record in the light most 
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favorable to the party opposing the motion for summaryjudgment and draws all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Rudd v. Merriff, 138 ldaho 256,66 P.3d 
230 (2003). When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review, is not 
bound by findings of the district court, and is free to draw its own conclusions from the 
evidence presented. Leffunich v. Key Bank Nat? Ass'n, 141 ldaho 362, 366, 109 P.3d 
11 04, 1108 (2005). 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Recognize the Genuine Issues 
of Material Fact Created by the Affidavits of Tricia Callies 
That Precluded the Summary Judgment at Issue in This Appeal. 
In its analysis of the facts of the case, the trial court focused upon the state of the 
property descriptions as of the signing of the contracts and failed to take into account the 
additions to, and revisions of, the original agreements as the projects evolved: 
Here, although the listing agreement explicitly stated that a legal description was 
attached as 'addendum # 1 ,' and provided that the 'addendum must accompany the 
original listing,' the addenda were not attached to any of the agreements. . . . 
Moreover, because the record unequivocally establishes that the listing agreements 
erroneously stated that the legal descriptions were attached, when in fact no such 
descriptions were affixed, when construing I.C. 5 9-503 in conjunction with I.C. § 54- 
2050 as in Garner, the Court finds that the property descriptions are insufficient to 
satisfy the statute of frauds and fail to meet the statutory requirement of I.C. 5 54- 
2050(l)(b). 
R, Vol. II, pp. 31 1-312. Neither CPM nor Callies has claimed that the original agreements 
included a detailed description of the property to be sold at the time that they were signed. 
However, both CPM and Callies assert that, whatever the deficiencies of the agreements 
in their original form, the parties remedied those problems by subsequently adding legally 
enforceable property descriptions to the contracts before any transactions closed and 
before CPM or Callies made any claim that commissions were due. In taking this position, 
CPM and Callies recognize that O'Neal has taken a contrary position in his affidavit by 
claiming that he never consented to the addition of the property descriptions to the 
agreement. R, Exh. 2, paragraphs 9 and 10. But all that testimony does is give rise to an 
issue of fact that should have been resolved by a jury after hearing all of the evidence 
rather than by the court on the motions for partial summary judgment. Hayes v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 143 ldaho 204, 41 P.3d 1073 (2006). 
There is no rule of law to the effect that the parties to a contract cannot amend the 
agreement to correct an omission, oversight or error in the original documentation or even 
just because they choose to do so. To the contrary, ldaho law expressly permits such 
revisions when the evidence supports the conclusion that they actually occurred. Parties 
are free to amend their agreements. Traylor V. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 99 ldaho 560, 585 
P.2d 970 (1978). The terms of a written contract may be varied, modified, waived, 
annulled or wholly set aside by any subsequently executed contract, whether the later 
agreement be in writing or parol. Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 101 ldaho 
226,611 P.2d 101 1 (1979); Harrington v. McCarfhy, 91 ldaho 307,420 P.2d 790 (1966). 
Consent to a modification of a prior written agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct consistent with the asserted modification. Resource Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94 
ldaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972); Jones v. Micron Technology, Inc., 129 ldaho 241, 923 
P.2d 486 (Ct.App. 1996). 
The listing agreements at issue in this lawsuit are "RE-16 EXCLUSIVE SELLER 
REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT" forms. In relevant part, the form documents provide: 
"2. PROPERTY ADDRESS AND LEGAL DESCRIPTION. The property address and the complete legal description of 
the property are as set forth below. 
Address 
County City Zip 
Legal Description 
or "Legal Description Attached as addendum # 
listing)" 
(Addendum must accompany original 
(Exhibits # 8 and 9 to Clerk's Record on Appeal). Nothing in this printed language states 
when the addendum must be attached to or accompany the printed contract. The district 
simply assumed that the description had to be attached when the contract was originally 
signed. In so doing, the court ignored the rule that the conduct of the parties to the 
contract is an important factor that should be considered in interpreting an agreement in 
the event of a dispute as to its meaning, Commercial Credit Corp. v. S&EEnferprises, Inc., 
97 ldaho 441, 546 P.2d 396 (1976), and all of the historical evidence offered by Callies 
concerning the seven other subdivisions that the parties had sold using the same contract 
forms and following the same process that was employed in the marketing of the two 
projects at issue. That evidence uniformly militates in favor of the interpretation that the 
agreement permitted the parties to incorporate legally enforceable property descriptions 
into their agreements at some time after the documents were originally signed. 
Moreover, this conclusion corroborates other testimony by Callies that, after the 
execution of the original documents, the parties added to their contracts legal descriptions 
of the individual units provided by O'Neal in the form of preliminary and final plats as those 
documents became available in the course of developing the two projects at issue in this 
appeal. Since on a motion for summary judgment, all of Callies' testimony must be 
presumed to be true, Hei v. Holzer, 139 ldaho 31, 73 P.2d 94 (2003), this court cannot 
reasonably hold, as a matter of law, that the parties did not contemplate the addition of 
property descriptions to their agreements as those descriptions became available, 
Moreover, even if the parties did originally contemplate the attachment of the 
property descriptions at the time that they executed the original documents, the case law 
cited above amply demonstrates that they were free to alter and amend their original 
contracts at a later time. The testimony by Callies regarding the later inclusion by the 
parties of detailed property descriptions into their agreements is entirely consistent with the 
conclusion that the parties did, in fact, amend their agreements as they progressed through 
the projects. 
The trial court's analysis simply assumed away these factual issues and adopted 
the contested testimony of O'Neal to the effect that he had not consented to any addition 
to, or revision of, the original agreements. R, Exh. 2, paragraphs 9 and 10. By doing that, 
the court implicitly decided the disputed issue of fact in favor of CBI, Charter Pointe and 
Silver Oaks based upon its perception of relative merits of the affidavits of O'Neal and 
Callies. It is well established that this is erroneous on the context of summary judgment 
proceedings. Collord v. Cooley, 92 ldaho 789,451 P.2d 535 (1969). If the record permits 
conflicting inferences, or where reasonable minds can reach difference conclusions from 
the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 
ldaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). The summary judgment granted by the district court in 
this case should be reversed on account of its failure to recognize the issues of fact that 
precluded that judgment. 
2. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Listing Agreements Were Not 
Enforceable for Lack of Legally Enforceable Descriptions of the Property. 
The analysis of Section 1 of this brief now brings us to the question of whether the 
legal descriptions added to the agreements after they were signed, whether by original 
intent or by subsequent amendment of the contracts, were "legally enforceable" under 
ldaho Code Section 9-508 or ldaho Code Section 9-503. It is important to note that the 
trial court never reached this issue, because neither CBI, Charter Pointe nor Silver Oaks 
made any argument that the property descriptions used by Callies and CPM in marketing 
the property were deficient. Instead, the only claim advanced in the motions for summary 
judgment was the position, shown in Section 1 of this brief to be untenable, that the 
agreements were not enforceable simply because the property descriptions were not a part 
of the agreements when they were originally signed. The sufficiency of the'descriptions 
that Callies asserts to have been added to the contracts may be important, however, given 
this court's power to affirm the decision of the trial court on grounds not used by the trial 
court as the basis for its decision. See McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 ldaho 657,851 
P.2d 953 (1993); Martin v. Spalding, 133 ldaho 469, 988 P.2d 695 (Ct.App. 1998). 
As explained by this court in Central ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 ldaho 306, 
442 P.2d 442 (1968), ldaho Code Section 9-508 provides that, in the context of listing 
agreements like those at issue in this case, the descriptions of the property affected by the 
agreements are sufficient where it is shown that there is no misunderstanding between the 
seller and broker as to the property involved and where the descriptions are sufficient to 
enable the broker to locate the property, show it and point out its boundaries to the 
prospective purchasers. 
In this case, viewed on the light most favorable to CPM and Callies, the record 
shows that O'Neal gave Callies legal descriptions of the individual units in the projects at 
issue that were based either on preliminary or final plats, depending upon the status of the 
-11- 
project at the time. No one has claimed any misunderstanding as to the property that was 
involved in any one of the many agreements brokered by Callies that are at issue in this 
lawsuit. No one has claimed that Callies was not able to show the property to the 
prospective buyers. There is no evidence that any agreement brokered by Callies failed 
to close on account of a misunderstanding by anyone as to what property was being 
bought or sold. To the contrary, the fact that many of the transactions brokered by Callies 
actually closed reasonably suggests that she was, in fact, able to show the property 
adequately. Thus, the record establishes that the descriptions appended to the listing 
agreements at issue in this lawsuit meet the standards established by ldaho Code Section 
9-508 and Central ldaho Agency. 
Stated in other terms, while it is undisputed that the listing agreements included only 
vague descriptions of the property to be sold when they were originally signed, they 
included precise definitions of the property when transactions began to close, which is 
when Callies and CPM made their claims for commissions The sufficiency of the legal 
description when the listing agreement was originally signed is not the real issue. Instead, 
the issue is, or at least should be, the sufficiency of those descriptions when the claims for 
commissions were asserted. Callies' testimony indicates those descriptions to be very 
precise at that time, and O'Neal's testimony to the contrary must, for purposes of analyzing 
the motion for partial summary judgment, be disregarded. This court should rule 
accordingly by reversing the summary judgment granted by the trial court. 
Stated in other terms, under ldaho Code Section 9-508 and Central ldaho Agency, 
the test is whether the parties had a meeting of the minds as to the property subject to the 
brokerage agreement. Whether there has been a meeting of the minds on any issue is 
generally a determination left to the trier of fact. Hess v. Wheeler, 127 ldaho 151, 823 
P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1995). Given the conflicting testimony by O'Neal and Callies in their 
affidavits, and the rules regarding that evidence on summary judgment proceedings, this 
court cannot reasonably uphold a grant of summary judgment against CPM and Callies on 
the basis that the record fails to establish a meeting of the minds in this case. Central 
ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, supra. 
Under ldaho Code Section 9-503, the standard is different: the description of the 
property must be such that it can be ascertained without resort to parol evidence or such 
that the quantity, identity or boundaries of the property can be determined from the face 
of the agreement. Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire,140 ldaho 276, 
92 P.3d 526 (2004). As stated in Garnerv. Bartschi, 139 ldaho 430,80 P.3d 1031 (2003): 
"As a general rule, a written instrument purporting to convey real property 
must contain a sufficient description of the property. A description contained 
in a deed will be sufficient so long as quan.tity,-identity or boundaries of 
property can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference 
to extrinsic evidence to which it refers." 
In this case, if the court agrees with the proposition that it is an issue of fact as to 
whether the property descriptions that O'Neal gave Callies were incorporated into the 
agreements between the parties, the conclusion that the trial court should have denied the 
motions for summary judgment under this standard follows immediately because those 
descriptions tie the individual units to either preliminary or final plats for the projects at 
issue. Since the property descriptions referred to a plat, it is hard to imagine how they 
could be more precise. Certainly, this court cannot hold at this stage of the proceedings, 
as a matter of law, that a reference to a plat is not a legally enforceable description of the 
property. 
CPM and Callies believe that the district court's error in this regard lay in its failure 
to consider the property descriptions to which Callies testified as additions to, or revisions 
of, the parties' agreements. Instead, the court treated the documents originally signed by 
the parties as their entire agreements and Callies' testimony regarding the property 
descriptions only as parol evidence intended to provide descriptions that were not 
otherwise included in the agreement, apparently because they were not "attached" to and 
did not "accompany" the printed agreement as called for in the printed contract. R, Vol. 
11, p. 312. This analysis, however, overlooks the possibility that the parties waived or 
modified this term of the original contract by means of the subsequent additions to, or 
revisions of, the original agreement by means of the property descriptions to which Callies 
testified. "Parties to an unperformed written contract may, by mutual consent, modify it by 
altering, excising or adding provisions, and such modification may be by parol agreement 
or inferred from the conduct of the parties." Harrington v. McCarfhy, supra. In view of 
Callies' testimony, it is a question of fact whether or not the parties modified or eliminated 
any requirement in the contract that the property descriptions be attached to, or 
accompany those documents. 
There is no legal reason why the property descriptions absolutely had to beattached 
to the original contract documents, for it is well settled in ldaho that a contract may be 
comprised of several documents. Hunt v. Capital State Bank, 12 ldaho 588, 87 P. 1129 
(1906). The question of whether a written contract has been modified by oral agreement 
is for the trier of fact. Denneft v. Kuenzli, 130 ldaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Similarly, the question of whether the parties intended their contract to be comprised of 
several documents is a question of fact, not properly resolved on summary judgment. Cf., 
Armand v. Opportunity Management Co., Inc., 141 ldaho 709,117 P.3d 123 (2005); Miller 
v. Estate of Prater, 141 ldaho 208, 108 P.3d 355 (2005). 
For all of the reasons set forth here, this court should reverse the summary 
judgment against CPM and Callies to permit a finding of fact to evaluate the sufficiency of 
the legal descriptions appended by the parties to their original agreements. 
3. The District Court Erred in Failing to Apply ldaho Code 
Section 9-508 Rather Than ldaho Code Section 9-503 
to the Motions for Summary Judgment. 
While the summary judgment granted by the trial court should be reversed in any 
event for the reasons set forth in sections I and 2 of this brief, the trial court and parties 
will, on reward, once again be faced with the issue of deciding, in light of all the evidence, 
whether the property descriptions in the listing agreements at issue in this case are legally 
enforceable. When they reach that point, they need to know what statute is controlling. 
Therefore, to assist the district court and the parties on remand, CPM and Callies request 
the court to review the final court's conclusion that ldaho Code Section 9-503 rather than 
ldaho Code Section 9-508 defines the proper standard. See Messina v. Ker, 96 ldaho 75, 
524 P.2d 536 (1974); Sulik v. Central Valley Farms, Inc., 95 ldaho 826, 521 P.2d 144 
(1 974). 
ldaho Code Section 54-2050(1)(b) requires brokerage representation agreements 
such as those involved in this action to include "a legally enforceable description of the 
property." The question then becomes one of determining exactly what that means. One 
possible point of reference is ldaho Code Section 9-503, which is a statute of frauds that 
concerns, by its express terms, transfers of interests in real property. The other possible 
point of reference is ldaho Code Section 9-508, which is a statute of frauds that deals 
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specifically with real estate commission agreements. Having identified the possible points 
of reference, the issue becomes one of choosing between them. Neither statute expressly 
requires a description of the property at issue. However, both statutes have been held by 
the courts to require such a description. See Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. 
Crandlemire, supra (I.C. Section 9-503), and Central ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, supra 
(I.C. Section 9-508). 
Nevertheless, the choice between the two statutes is rendered easy by the maxim 
of statutory construction that statutes concerning the same subject matter, or which are "in 
pari materia", must be construed together. Matter ofAdopfion of Chaney, 126 ldaho 554, 
887 P.2d 1061 (1995). Both ldaho Code Section 54-2050 and ldaho Code Section 9-508 
concern real estate brokerage agreements. ldaho Code Section 9-503 concerns, as noted 
above, transfers of real property. 
Idaho's Supreme Court has recognized that brokerage contracts are not intended 
to transfer real property. See Central ldaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, supra. Therefore, in 
analyzing the sufficiency of a legal description under ldaho Code Section 54-2050, ldaho 
Code Section 9-508, rather than ldaho Code Section 9-503, should control, since like 
ldaho Code Section 54-2050, Section 9-508 specifically concerns real estate commission 
agreements. By contrast, ldaho Code Section 9-503 simply does not apply to this case 
because the controversy because the commission agreements at issue are not intended 
as contracts for the transfer of real property. 
The trial court's choice of ldaho Code Section 9-503 as the controlling statute 
followed from its conclusion that ldaho Code Section 54-2050(1)(b) was intended by the 
legislature to negate the holding of Central ldaho Agency. R, Vol. 11, p. 313. That 
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conclusion, however, is contrary to the rule of statutory construction that the court should 
presume that the legislature did intend to change the common law unless the language 
of the statute clearly indicates the legislature's intent to do so. Thompson v. City of 
Lewiston, 137 ldaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). In this case, ldaho Code Section 54- 
2050(l)(b) provides only that the legal description should be "legally enforceable" without 
defining the context in which the description had to be "legally enforceable" or the standard 
by which this had to be determined. 
It is presumed that the legislature knew of Central ldaho Agency when it enacted 
ldaho Code Section 54-2050. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District, 126 ldaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1999). Given that presumption, the language of 
54-2050(1)(b) cannot reasonably be understood clearly to indicate the legislature's 
disapproval of Centralldaho Agency and therefore should be read as an expression of the 
legislature's satisfaction with the court's construction of ldaho Code Section 9-508. The 
legislature could easily have made any dissatisfaction plain by adding an explicit reference 
to ldaho Code Section 9-503 in ldaho Code Section 54-2040(1)(b) with such language as, 
"A description of the property that is legally enforceable under ldaho Code Section 9-503. 
That would clearly have indicated the legislature's disagreement with Central ldaho 
Agency. In the absence of such clarity, ldaho law requires ldaho Code Section 54- 
2040(l)(b) to be understood as an endorsement of the court's prior construction of ldaho 
Code Section 9-508. Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 41 ldaho 776, 242 P. 785 
(1928). 
The requirements of ldaho Code Section 9-508, including the adequacy of the legal 
description of the property concerned by a brokerage contract are defined in Central ldaho 
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Agency, lnc. v. Turner, supra. That case, in fact, expressly deals with at length with the 
question of legal descriptions. 
Despite that fact, the trial court in this case mentioned Central Idaho Agency in the 
course of its opinion only to state that it was not controlling. R, Vol. 11, p. 312. In so doing, 
however, the trial court failed to recognize the full import of the holding in that case: 
By a strained construction of the decision in Allen v. Kitchen, it would be 
Dossible to hold that the descri~tion involved in this case could be corrected bv oarol 
or extrinsic evidence so as to "applyu it to the property to be sold. However, we 'think 
it illogical to apply the rule of the Allen case-in which the plaintiff sought specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of real estate-to an action upon a brokerage 
contract as was done in Murphy v. Livesay. A contract employing a broker to find 
a purchaser of real property, is not a contract to sell, convey, or encumber real 
property or any interest therein. It is purely a contract of employment for services 
to be performed by the broker for a commission to be paid upon the occurrence of 
certain specified events. Ordinarily such a contract would not support an action to 
compel conveyance of the property involved. The present action does not seek any 
such relief. It was brought solely for the recovery of the commission provided for in 
the agreement. In such a case the description in the agreement is sufficient where 
it is shown that there is no misunderstanding between the property owner and the 
broker as to the property to be offered for sale, and where it is sufficient to enable 
the broker to locate the property, show it, and point out its boundaries to the 
prospective purchaser. In this case both plaintiff and defendant knew from the 
description contained in the agreement that the property to be sold was the entire 
"Clara Turner farm." The farm was well known in the neighborhood. Its exact 
acreage and location as to county and section numbers was readily available and 
could be established by parol or other extrinsic evidence without varying, adding to, 
or subtracting from the agreement which the parties intended to make. Such 
evidence would apply the description to the land in harmony with the manifest 
intention of the parties. 
We conclude that the description in the brokerage agreement involved herein 
was sufficient for the purposes of this action. The decisions in Murphy v. Livesay, 
supra, and Laker Land & Loans v. Nye, supra-in some respects distinguishable from 
the case at bar-to the extent that they are in conflict herewith, are overruled. 
The applicable rule as variously stated by the following authorities is 
that the listing agreement must, inter alia, identify the real property adequately as 
between the broker and the vendor. If it is thus sufficient to identify the property, 
although defective, ambiguous, or uncertain, it may be supplemented by parol or 
extrinsic evidence. Such evidence may be presented, not to create a description, 
but to cure a defective one otherwise sufficient. When that is done it will be held in 
compliance with the statute, I.C. § 9-508. See Sherwood v. Gerking, 209 Or. 493, 
306 P.2d 386 (1957) and cases cited therein; Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 
P.2d 134, 159 A.L. R. 256 (1945) and cases cited therein; See generally, Anno. 38 
A.L.R.2d 542, at 557, § 6; Anno. 80 A.L.R. 1456, at 1466; 12 Am.Jur.Zd, Brokers, 
46,252; 12 C.J.S. Brokers, 62; contra, see Heim v. Faulstich, Wash., 424 P.2d 
1012 (1967). 
Central ldaho Agency v. Turner, supra. It is worth noting that Murphy v. Livesay, 34 ldaho 
793,197 P. 536 (1921) and LakerLand& Loans v. Ney, 40 ldaho 793,237 P. 630 (1925), 
the two cases overruled in Central ldaho Agency, were listinglcommission cases which 
applied ldaho Code Section 9-503 in their analysis. That is exactly what the trial court did 
in this case. If that approach was erroneous when Central ldaho Agency was decided, it 
is still erroneous now. 
The language quoted from Central ldaho Agency is broad enough to cover the 
issues involved in this case. Whatever the deficiency in the legal descriptions alleged in 
this action, ldaho Code Section 9-508 is still the controlling statute. Stated in other words, 
the lack of a description of the property in the original agreement does not render ldaho 
Code Section 9-503 the controlling statute. Instead, the effect of that omission should be 
analyzed under ldaho Code Section 9-508 rather than ldaho Code Section 9-503. 
The cases cited by the trial court do not alter this conclusion. These cases include: 
Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, supra; Allen v. Kitchen, 16 ldaho 
133, 100 P. 1052 (1 909); City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 ldaho 
239, 16 P. 3d 915 (2000), and Garner v. Bartschi, supra. (R. Vol. 11, 307-313). 
Lexington Heights concerned the sufficiency of a property description in a case 
involving the transfer of real property. In the course of its analysis, the Court stated: "The 
instant case is not one to enforce a listing agreement." 140 ldaho at 285. Logically 
enough in view of that statement, the court never mentioned ldaho Code Section 9-508 in 
the course of its opinion. 
Allen was an "action by the plaintiff for the specific performance of an executory 
contract for the sale of real estate." 16 ldaho at 134. Therefore, like Lexington Heights 
and ANen, did not address the issue in the instant case which involves, not a transfer of 
real property, but commission agreements between the seller and real estate broker. And, 
probably because the decision was announced in 1909, and ldaho Code Section 9-508 
was first enacted in 1919, the court did not consider ldaho Code Section 9-508 in the 
course of its decision. 
Like Lexington Heights and Allen, City of Kellogg concerned the sufficiency of the 
legal description in a case involving a contract for the transfer of real property, not a 
commission agreement. Therefore, the court's analysis did not address ldaho Code 
Section 9-508. Given the issues of the case, there was no reason for the court to have 
discussed that statute and that Central ldaho Agency is the controlling precedent. See R, 
VOI. II, pp. 312-313. 
The case of Garner v. Bartschi, supra, involved the sufficiency of the legal 
description both as to a purchase and sale agreement and as to a listing agreement. In 
affirming a summary judgment against the real estate agent, the court relied upon ldaho 
Code Sections 54-2050 and 9-503. There is, however, no indication in the opinion that any 
of the parties had asserted ldaho Code Section 9-508 to be controlling. In fact, the court's 
discussion in Garner never once mentions ldaho Code Section 9-508 or Central ldaho 
Agency. Hence, the precedential value of Garner in this action is doubtful because Callies 
and CPM have consistently argued that ldaho Code Section 9-508 is the controlling 
statute. 
This is not to say that the bottom-line result of Garnerwas wrong. Taking the court's 
analysis of the facts involved in that case at face value, it appears that the property 
description in that case would have failed under either ldaho Code Section 9-503 or 
Section 9-508. CPM and Callies do assert, however, that Garner is of limited precedential 
value in the case at bar, because for whatever reason, the court did not analyze ldaho 
Code Section 9-508 or Central ldaho Agency in the course of reaching its decision. 
For all of the reasons set forth here, this court should reverse the conclusion by the 
trial court that ldaho Code Section 9-503 was the controlling statute for purposes of this 
action. 
4. The District Erred in its Dismissing the Claims of Callies 
and CPM to Recover by Virtue of Part Performance 
In its memorandum decision, the district court disallowed any claims based upon the 
doctine of partial performance on the theory that the parties to this action never reached 
a "complete agreement" on the terms of their listing contract. R, Vol. ll, pp. 313-314. This 
court recently explained the doctrine of partial performance in Chapin v. Linden, 144 ldaho 
The doctrine of part performance provides that when the parties to an agreement 
fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of 
frauds, the agreement "may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the 
purchaser has partly performed the agreement." Bear Island Wafer Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Brown, 125 ldaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994). 
The doctrine of part performance works in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. "Under ldaho law, part performance per se does not remove a contract 
from the operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, the doctrine of part performance 
is best understood as a soecific form of the more aeneral orinciole of eauitable 
estoppel." Leffunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at7 109. (citing sword v. 'Sweet, 
140 ldaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492,499 (2004)). Equitable estoppel generally, and 
the doctrine of part performance specifically, assume the existence of a complete 
agreement. See Letfunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109. Like any contract 
for the sale of land, an oral agreement "must be complete, definite, and certain in 
all its terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced 
to certainty," before it will be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of 
part performance. Leffunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109 (citing Bearlsland 
WaferAss'n, Inc., 125 ldaho at 723, 874 P.2d at 534). 
The threshold auestion for this Court, then, is whether there was a meetina of the 
minds between the Chaoins and the Lindens on the essential terms of their 
aareement. 
Chapin, 144 ldaho at 396, 162 P.3d at 775 (emphasis added). 
As explained in Sections 1 and 2 of this brief, the district court's analysis of the issue 
of whether there was a meeting of the minds never went beyond its discussion of the 
documents signed by the parties at the outset of the projects in question. And, even in that 
context, the court never considered the issue of whether the par01 agreement of the parties 
was complete, confusing that issue with that of whether the written statement of the 
agreement was complete enough to satisfy the statute of frauds. This is evident form the 
fact that the district court's analysis of the merits of the motion for partial summary 
judgment that preceded its conclusions on the issue of partial performance focused only 
upon the efficiency of the property descriptions in the written documents and not on the 
different question of whether the parties had actually reached an oral understanding. See 
R, Vol. 11, pp. 307-312. Hence, the district court had no basis for concluding, as quoted 
above, that the parties had not reached a complete oral agreement. 
Had the district court studied the issue, it would have found that the record did not 
permit the entry of summary judgment. The motions for partial summary judgment were 
grounded on O'Neal's affidavit to the effect that the written contracts did not include any 
descriptions of the concerned property. R, Exh. 2. Callies and CPM responded to that 
affidavit with evidence asserting that there were complete understandings between the 
parties and that those understandings had been reduced to writings that had been made 
a part of the contract. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2 and Exh. 9, paragraph 2. And, as explained 
above, Callies corroborated that assertion with testimony concerning the other projects 
completed by the parties using the same contract forms and following the same procedure. 
R, Exh. 8, paragraph 2 and Exh. 9, paragraph 2. O'Neal never rebutted either Callies' 
assertion that the understanding was complete or the historical evidence that she offered 
in support of that position. Hence, there is no factual basis in the record for the district 
court's conclusion that the parties' parol understanding was incomplete. The summary 
judgment granted by the court on that issue of partial performance should be reversed for 
that reason. 
A further basis for overturning the district court's judgment lies in its failure to 
analyze the extent to which Callies and CPM had performed their end of the agreements. 
In this connection, the record established, without contradiction: (1) reservation 
agreements for all property subject to the brokerage agreements had been secured by Ms. 
Callies, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 3 and Exh. 9, paragraph 3; (2) earnest money checks for all 
of the property were made out and delivered to Charter Builders, Inc., and received by 
O'Neal himself, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 4 and Exh. 9, paragraph 4; (3) that many of the 
transactions brokered by Callies actually closed, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 9; (4) Callies and 
CPM invested substantial time into the projects and incurred $97,219.26 of expenses in 
the course of performing their work, R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 10 and 12 and Exh. 9, 
paragraphs 14 and 15; (5) the failure of the transactions that did not close was due only 
to the failure of CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks to complete the improvements on 
time. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 13. For purposes of this appeal, there is no question but that 
the record establishes the performance by CPM and Callies of their obligations under the 
listing agreements. 
For all of the reasons set forth in this section of the memorandum, the district court's 
summary judgment on the issue of partial performance should be reversed. 
5. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Claims of Callies 
and CPM to Recover on the Theory of Quasi Estoppel 
In its memorandum decision, the district court rejected the claims of CPM and 
Callies on the theory of quasi estoppel with the following comments: 
Here, while Defendants obtained earnest moniesfrom potential buyers forthe Silver 
Oaks and Charter Pointe projects, presumably through Callies' efforts, their 
subsequent repudiation of the listing agreements is permitted due to the invalidity 
of the property descriptions contained therein. . . . Further the Defendants' conduct 
is not unconscionable as a matter of law and the Plaintiffs have failed to provide any 
evidence that the agreements were consummated due to any wrongful act of the 
Defendants. . . . 
R. Vol. 11. 315. 
This court explained the elements of quasi estoppel in a case very similar to that at 
bar, Garner V. Bartschi, supra, in the following words: 
Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable advantage, 
or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing 
positions. ~und&s v. Estate of Snyder, 131 ldaho 689, 695, 963 ~ . 2 h  372,378 
(1998). Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require 
misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Id. 
The elements of quasi-estoppel have been defined as follows: 
[I]t precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine 
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he 
accepted a benefit. The act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought 
must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some 
disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel must have 
been induced to change his position. Eastern ldaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n 
v. Neibaur, 133 ldaho 402,410, 987 P.2d 314, 322 (1999). 
Garner v. Bartschi, supra. In this case, Callies' affidavit establishes, for purposes of this 
appeal, that CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks allowed Callies and CPM to invest 
substantial amounts of time and effort into the marketing and sale of the properties at 
issue. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 2-5 and 8-12 and Exh. 9, paragraphs 2-4 and 10-15. At one 
point, O'Neal implicitly represented to Callies that the sellers could honor the listing 
agreements. R, Exh. 8, paragraph 5 and Exh. 9, paragraph 6. The seller, Charter Pointe 
and Silver Oaks, accepted the earnest moneys collected by Callies and CPM, amounting 
to more than $1,000,000.00, R, Exh. 8, paragraph 8 ($391,875.00) and Exh. 9, paragraph 
10 ($656,000.00). Callies worked hard enough on the projects at issue that she was 
required to pass on other opportunities to work and incurred $97,219.26 in the course of 
her marketing efforts. R, Exh. 8, paragraphs 10 and 12 and Exh. 9, paragraphs 14 and 15. 
None of this evidence is contradicted in the record. Thus, it would appear that, measured 
by the standard enunciated in Garner v. Barischi, supra, CPM and Callies have established 
a prima facie case of quasi estoppel. 
The district court's holding to the contrary is virtually inexplicable. Estoppel is an 
equitable remedy. Allen v. Dunston, 131 ldaho 464,958 P.2d 11 50 (1 998). Claims arising 
in equity will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available. Iron Eagle 
Development, LLC v. Qualify Design Systems, Inc., 138 ldaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 (2003). 
Thus, for the district court to point out the legal impediment to recovery of damages for 
breach of contract should have established the basis for seeking equitable relief. See 
Holscherv. James, 124 ldaho 443,860 P.2d 646 (1993). The district court, however, cited 
the legal impediment as a basis for denying equitable relief, which would appear to turn the 
rules cited above on their head. 
One who tacitly encourages work to be done and who accepts the benefits of that 
work cannot afterwards exercise rights contrary to the prior consent and acceptance of 
benefits, if the consent and benefits have induced the opposite party to change his position 
to his prejudice. Seeling v. Security National Bank of Fairfield, 40 ldaho 574, 235 P. 976 
(1925). In this case, CBI, Charter Point and Silver Oaks allowed CPM and Callies to 
secure numerous contracts at a substantial cost of time and money ($97,219.26) and 
accepted more than $1,000,000.00 of benefits resulting from that work. The trial court 
held, as a matter of law, that this was not taking an unconscionable advantage. Intuitively, 
this conclusion appears to be unsupportable. The law school example of requiring the 
homeowner to pay the child who mows his lawn, even in the absence of a legally binding 
contract, pales in comparison to the facts of this case, which appear, even on the face of 
O'Neal's affidavit to present a classic case of "lying in the weeds" by allowing CPM and 
Callies to perform substantial work for the benefit of CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, 
while refusing to agree to the correction of the contract that would allow the broker to be 
paid for that work. 
Finally, the district court's reliance upon Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 
ldaho 253, 846 P.2d 904 (1993), R, Vol. 11, p. 15, is predicated upon a misreading of that 
case. The only reference in that case to a wrongful act appeared in the court's discussion 
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of how a seller's wrongful refusal to close a contract negotiated by the broker could not 
defeat the right of the broker to payment of a commission. 123 ldaho at 260. That holding 
provides no justification for the requirement imposed by the district court in this case that 
CPM and Callies had to prove that the listing agreements were consummated due to a 
wrongful act of CBI, Charter Pointe or Silver Oaks. This requirement appears to contradict 
the statement in Garner v. Bartschi, supra, that quasi estoppel does not require proof of 
a misrepresentation by anyone. Given the fact that the district court's reliance upon 
Margaret H. Wayne Trust is questionable, the following conclusion, which itself is contrary 
to unimpeachable precedent, cannot withstand appellate review. 
For all of the reasons set forth in this section of the brief, the summary judgment 
granted by the district court dismissing the claims of CPM and Callies on the theory of 
quasi estoppel should be reversed. 
6. Callies and CPM are Entitled to the Attorney Fees 
Incurred in Prosecuting This Appeal. 
Callies and CPM are entitled to the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal, 
because paragraph 23 of the listing agreements includes an attorney fee clause: 
In the event either party shall initiate and suit or action or appeal on any 
matter related to this Agreement the defaulting party shall pay the prevailing party 
all damages and expenses resulting from the default, including all reasonable 
attorneys' fees and all court costs and other expenses incurred by the prevailing 
party. 
In addition, the listing agreements are both contracts for services and commercial 
transactions, which means that Callies and CPM are also entitled to attorney fees under 
ldaho Code Section 12-120(3). See Tentingerv. McPheters, 132 ldaho 620,977 P.2d 234 
In making this request, Callies and CPM acknowledge that a reversal of the 
summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings does not guarantee that they will 
ultimately be the parties who prevail in this action. At a minimum, however, they are 
entitled to a ruling to the effect that, if they ultimately prevail in this action, they are entitled 
to the attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, CPM and Callies request this Court to reverse the 
summary judgment granted by the district court in all respects and to remand all of the claims 
at issue in this appeal, including those for breach of contract, partial performance and quasi 
estoppel, for a trial on the merits. Callies and CPM also request the court to hold that any 
issues concerning the legal enforceability of the property descriptions in the listing agreements 
should ultimately be resolved under ldaho Code Section 9-508 ratherthan ldaho Code Section 
9-503. Finally, Callies and CPM request the court to hold that they are entitled to the attorney 
fees incurred in the prosecution of this appeal, if not immediately, then at least in the event that 
they ultimately prevail on the claims at issue in this appeal. 
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